

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	25X1A
SUBJECT	Current Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy	DATE DISTR.	30 July 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	4
DATE OF INFO.	25X1A	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

25X1X

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

The following analysis of the internal and international consequences of Stalin's death is presented here: [REDACTED] 25X1X

- At the time when Stalin died and Malenkov became his successor, most experts in Soviet politics agreed that it was impossible to expect any profound changes in Soviet foreign policy and that one could rather expect further severance of East-West relations. Surprising political maneuvers of Malenkov and his companions to a certain degree have puzzled Western political circles, which are now ready to accept the theory about Soviet good will, aiming at reconciliation between the West and the East. In order to have at least an adequate idea about the aims pursued by this Soviet policy, it is necessary first of all to discuss the intended effects of these Soviet political maneuvers from the internal and foreign political points of view.

Internal Political Effects

- Stalin's death presumably caused considerable uneasiness, not only in the USSR but also in the satellite states. No one of the present Soviet leaders, including Malenkov, possesses that degree of personal authority which Stalin used to have. Consequently, Malenkov cannot be regarded as his actual successor. In all his decisions, Malenkov is far more bound by the opinion of Beriia, Molotov, and Bulganin than Stalin was and, therefore, he cannot be regarded as an absolute dictator of the Stalinist type. Since no form of dictatorship, such as it exists in the USSR today, tolerates any collective leadership, it can be expected that the present leaders will struggle with each other as to who is to become the real dictator in the USSR. It must be borne in mind that Communism, better to say: Stalinism, became in the USSR a sort of state political religion which must have its god. Such a god Stalin was until his death. The present Soviet rulers are taking pains to

SECRET

25X1A

SECRET

25X1A [REDACTED]

-2-

preserve this political monotheism in the USSR, because this is one of the mainstays of the Soviet system. The question is, of course, who will be this political god after Stalin's death? Therefore the Soviet rulers need some period of rest in order to fight this struggle undisturbed.

3. There exist already several indications that the Soviet rulers are now trying to gain the Soviet people for themselves and to prove that they intend to make a better policy than Stalin. These indications are the following: the announcement of amnesty, the reduction of prices, the release of the arrested physicians and the punishment of those who had accused them of various crimes, the arrest of the former Deputy Minister of State Security Ryumin, the deprivation of the Secretariat functions of Ignatyev, etc. When these indications are considered, there might arise an impression that the new Soviet management is entirely compact when it is able to do this. Past experiences, however, teach us that such a view would be unrealistic.
4. Stalin, in the period of struggle for power, collaborated with the right wing of the Party, namely, with Rykov, Tomskiy, and Bukharin, in order to oust Trotsky, Zinov'yev, and Kamenev. Having succeeded in this maneuver, he then removed Rykov and Tomskiy as well. Later on, Marshal Tukhachevskiy was liquidated, as well as other Soviet generals, under the pretext that they collaborated with the Germans. None the less, Stalin did not hesitate to conclude a treaty with Germany in 1939.
5. The above examples show that Machiavellism is an inherent component of Soviet policy. The present Soviet leaders are merely collaborators and/or disciples of Stalin; it cannot be expected, therefore, that they will deviate from this Machiavellian policy. It can be anticipated that he who will most adroitly use the principle Divide et impera among them will win the future struggle for power.
6. None of the Kremlin's new men feels already strong enough to be able to liquidate his rivals and to become thus an absolute dictator of the Soviet Union. They all now agree on the policy of appeasement, which they need for the stabilization of their power in the USSR. It looks as though the present Moscow management is trying above all to achieve internal stabilization in the USSR before it will launch any other political actions.
7. The USSR itself is not the only concern of Soviet rulers in the performance of this scheme. The political and economic situation in the satellite countries is far worse; the living standard is falling and, consequently, mistrust toward the Soviet system is increasing. If Moscow wants to keep these states in submission, she will sooner or later be compelled to make certain concessions, especially of an economic character, which will raise the living standard of the local population. The question is whether or not the USSR is able to solve these difficulties at all. It is apparent already today that the establishment of the Economic Council (Council for Mutual Economic Aid - CMEA) in Moscow brought to the satellite states only disadvantages and not advantages. If the Soviet Union should succeed in mitigating international tension and slowing down the tempo of Western armament, a certain portion of Soviet armament expenditure might be devoted to the economic stabilization of the satellite states. Thus, the present Soviet regime in the satellite states would be reinforced. Moscow cannot have in her struggle for world supremacy weak and dissatisfied allies. Therefore, before launching the general offensive, Moscow must try to consolidate her influence in these states, even at the cost of certain political and economic concessions. Alleviation of international tension would greatly help these plans.

International Political Effects

8. In an attempt to mitigate international tension, Moscow naturally also pursues certain international political aims, which may be summed up as outlined below.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1A [REDACTED]

-3-

9. Various acts of the USSR, aiming at the alleviation of international tension, must be considered as mere gestures, which promise much but which cannot be regarded as a proof of actual good will of the Soviet government. The fact that the Soviets are willing to conclude the armistice in Korea and that they made several conciliatory gestures at the UN session does not mean that the general international political line of the USSR has altered. From a closer examination of Soviet foreign policy since 1944, we may infer that the political tactics were based on the following principle: to drive up international tension to a certain point when war seemed inevitable—and suddenly to make a conciliatory gesture to alleviate that tension. These variations of Soviet foreign policy had considerable psychological effect on world public opinion. In any slight hint of the Soviets, individuals, and often even leading Western politicians, used to see more than was actually intended.
10. At the present moment (April 1953), the Soviets probably are exploiting certain hesitations of France and England and trying to convince them of Soviet "peaceful" intentions. In this way, the US is to be isolated from her West European allies and compelled to a more yielding disposition regarding Soviet wishes. Let me add that a Soviet ambassador to a Western nation once told me that the USSR believes that it might be possible to reach an agreement with Churchill, provided that England would gain a certain profit from such an agreement. Therefore, it can be expected that the USSR will continue its policy to sow the seeds of dissension among the NATO nations and to exploit such differences to its own advantage.
11. Another objective of the USSR is to impair the vigilance and preparedness of the West. NATO becomes more and more a serious obstacle to Soviet expansion. The Soviets are well aware of the fact that the integration, direct or indirect, of West Germany into the Western defense system would represent a further serious check to Soviet aggressive schemes.
12. It can be expected that the Soviets will be ready to make far-reaching concessions to the West in the question of the unification of Germany, provided that in this way the re-armament of Germany and its integration in the Western European defense system can be prevented. This, of course, does not mean that the Soviets are willing to leave Germany out of their aggressive plans. After the departure of the allied armies, it would be possible to organize more easily various propaganda campaigns and to prepare slowly the ground for Communist political schemes. The Soviets now mostly need time, even at the cost of temporary concessions. The concessions the Soviets currently offer the West are of such a kind that they cannot convince Western political circles of their sincerity. Until now, the Soviets have not expressed the least indication that they would be willing to give up their influence in the states they conquered after 1945. The case of Czechoslovakia in 1948 was particularly alarming. They also firmly refuse to conclude the peace treaty with Austria, because thus Czechoslovakia and Hungary would have longer frontiers with the western world, and this would lead to a further weakening of Soviet influence in these states. Let the Soviets manifest their good will by their readiness to settle the Austrian question and the problem of the satellite states of Central Europe, where it would suffice to arrange free elections, which would most probably fail to bring victory to the Communists.
13. Also, Soviet disarmament proposals are to be considered as mere phrases. The proof thereof is the recent offensive of the Indochinese Communists against the state Laos and the recent declaration of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Viliam Siroky, who officially announced the reinforcement of the Czechoslovak army. It is extremely doubtful that the Soviets would be ready to deal with the aforementioned questions at the eventual negotiations at all.
14. The Soviet rapprochement proposals can also be regarded as a part of their over-all "peace" propaganda. The outcome of the last session of the World Peace Council in Vienna has shown that the so-called "peace movement" is in a certain state of stagnation, as was evident from the speeches of some-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1A

-4-

delegates. The recent Soviet proposals will act as a certain injection for the "peace movement", which has been one of the most powerful propaganda weapons of the Soviets. It can be expected that the activity of various organs of the "peace movement" will soon be resumed. Interestingly enough, the leading organs of the "peace movement" until now have not adopted an attitude toward the Soviet "peace" proposals. They evidently await directives from Moscow, which in turn is waiting to see how the situation will develop.

15. On the whole, it can be said that there are no convincing proofs to the effect that the USSR has really changed its foreign political line. There has been, rather, a change of tactics, and the final foreign political objectives remain unchanged. This supposition seems to be corroborated by the fact that Moscow until now has not exchanged her diplomatic representatives in the West, though such a measure would be a logical consequence of an actual change of Soviet foreign policy. This has not happened; therefore, all the gestures of Soviet Government functionaries must be taken with a certain reserve.
16. This is not to say that all Soviet proposals should be refused a priori. It cannot be excluded that they contain a little sincerity too, owing to a certain political exigency. Refusal (by the US) of Soviet proposals without prior dealings would merely benefit Soviet propaganda and could even exercise a certain unfavorable influence on Western European public opinion, which yields relatively easily to the Soviet "peace campaign".
17. Therefore, it is necessary to choose in dealings with the Soviets a way which, provided the change of Soviet foreign policy is actual and sincere, would benefit both sides. However, if the apparent change in Soviet policy is merely a change of tactics, a more probable case, it will be necessary to proceed cautiously in order not to provide a propaganda weapon in the hands of the Soviets and their satellites. It is very difficult to fulfill these tasks, considering a certain lack of unity among the Western states. A dictatorial regime is more impressed by strength than by ideological democratic persuasion. If, however, the Western states were united and strong, this latter argument would be applicable to the Soviets more than any other. The Soviets are aware that their expansion against the united and strong democratic world of the West is less and less likely to have success, and for this reason they try by all means to prevent this unity of the West. Let me add once more that one of the main tasks of the Soviet and satellite diplomats in the West is to follow closely all the discords between the Western states and to report on these discords to their respective governments.
18. The present international political situation gives an opportunity to test Soviet sincerity and true Soviet intentions. In the meantime, when the future development cannot be safely predicted, it would be an error to be excessively optimistic, as for instance the French paper Le Monde is. Only time will show what are the real intentions of the present Soviet rulers.

SECRET